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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Management at the International 
Hellenic University.  
This study deals with investigating the underlying causes of voluntary audit of firms 
that may opt for not being audited. The study consists of two main parts dedicated to 
the topic's theoretical overview and empirical investigation. Relevant theory proposes 
that voluntary audit could be mainly seen as the result agency, management, and sig-
naling factors. However, the different criteria applied by different countries to exempt 
firms from auditing as well the contradictory existing empirical evidence, highlight the 
importance of continuous research on this study's topic. 
On the empirical level, the study focuses Greek firms. Despite the obvious interest of 
the topic, Greek researchers have not so provide conclusive evidence as to why Greek 
firms choose to be voluntarily audited. In brief, the study's evidence suggests that vol-
untary audit is mainly the result of firm size. Other factors, often cited in relevant liter-
ature, were found to have marginal or no effect at all.  
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 Introduction 
Auditing and, particularly, external auditing has been present since ancient times. Ac-
cording to Lee and Azham (2008), proofs of auditing are reported by Aristotle, the 
Greek philosopher. In general, auditing serves as reassurance mechanism to individuals 
that cannot themselves assure the trustworthiness of the audited object. Internal au-
diting can be tracked in more recent times, i.e. the 20th century.  
With respect to economic entities (especially corporations), auditing has to do mainly 
with financial (economic) information reported to both internal and external stake-
holders. Stakeholders have an obvious interest in objective financial information given 
the economic nature of their relationship with companies. For instance, creditors are 
interested in lending their money to organizations that will be able to repay it in the 
future, investors seek to find prosperous investments to put their money on, employ-
ees normally prefer work for financially viable employers and so on. From an insider's 
point of view, auditing is crucial in assuring that resources are consumed the way they 
are supposed to according to relevant decisions, people involved act in a legitimate 
manner and so on.  
Despite audit's long history and significance, there exists enough evidence to support 
that not all relevant issues have been resolved. A number of corporate scandals with 
tremendous (negative) social impact as well as the absence of obligatory auditing for 
many, if not most, companies can prove this. Although auditing is, in many countries, 
obligatory for large companies, among which listed ones, most small and/ or medium 
size (SMEs) companies are not required to perform financial report auditing. However, 
as Ayyagari et al. (2011) reveal, SMEs, by number, dominate the world business stage. 
The authors report that despite the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, estimates 
suggest that more than 95% of enterprises across the world are SMEs, accounting for 
approximately 60% of private sector employment. Apart from their contribution to 
employment, SMEs are responsible for 51% of high-income countries GDP (Edinburgh 
Group, 2012). Despite SMEs importance to worldwide economy, relevant literature has 
put but limited effort to investigate a number of topics regarding such firms among 
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which the investigation of voluntary audit by companies alike. This topic is important 
for several reasons, the most obvious one being that most SMEs are free to avoid au-
diting. Thus, the following question comes in mind: why do some SMEs choose to have 
their financial reports audited while others don't? A number of theories have been 
proposed to explain the aforementioned choice, the major ones being presented in 
this paper. From a more practical point of view, revealing the factors affecting volun-
tary auditing could be helpful to numerous company stakeholders. It should be re-
minded that information regarding SMEs is, by nature, limited or, at least, not as freely 
available as for larger companies. Consequently, it is important to know which factors 
determine voluntary audit and, thus, improve the quality of information about SMEs. 
This study's motivation is mostly based on the fact that, in Greece, almost no effort has 
been made so far to explain why some companies choose to be voluntarily audited. A 
research for related academic articles in some widely used academic article databases, 
e.g. Sciencedirect, Emerald Insight, Business Source Complete, returned but limited 
results none of which investigates the topic of voluntary audit of Greek firms. For ex-
ample the search for articles including the words “audit” and “Greece” or “audit” and 
“Greek” in their title returned 364 results none of which deals with voluntary audit of 
firms. A similar search in Emerald Insight returned no result while doing so in Business 
Source Complete returned 12 results that do not relate to the topic. It is, thus, evident 
that there exist space to conduct relevant research with respect to Greek firms in or-
der to assist both the academic and professional community. By definition, our interest 
is on SMEs that, in Greece, account for about half of economic activity in terms of em-
ployment1 (GSEVEE, 2014). In brief, this study reveals that the vast majority of Greek 
SMEs chooses not to opt for audit making it difficult, in the first place, to conduct rele-
vant research. According to this study's findings, corporate size significantly and posi-
tively affects voluntary audit of Greek firms. It is then possible that factors, like the 
ability to deal with auditing costs and the intention to use voluntary audit as “forerun-
ner” (e.g. of creditworthiness) or, similarly, protective device against internal control 
loss, explain voluntary audit of Greek firms. It is also found that voluntary audit is not a 
                                                     
1 SMEs are often called the “backbone” of Greek economy. 
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matter of ownership structure. This is quite interesting since Greek SMEs are usually 
family owned and it is then expected to be reluctant to outsiders (even to auditors).   
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Theoretical Review 
This chapter deals with auditing from a theoretical point of view. In particular, the his-
tory of auditing is first reviewed. Criteria of exception from mandatory audit are then 
reported and theories of voluntary auditing are developed. Existing empirical evidence 
is summarized at the end of the chapter. 
History of auditing 
According to Gill and Cosserat (1996), auditing was born simultaneously with the in-
dustrial revolution in UK at late 19th century. Both the size of companies and frequent 
corporate scandals leading to major losses for many stakeholders highlighted the ne-
cessity of auditing in order to protect investors' interest (Porter et al., 2005). However, 
Leung et al. (2004) report that there were no predefined auditing standards or rules 
and auditor's duties were largely defined by judicial decisions regarding fraud scandals.  
In more recent years, the Great Recession, following the 1929 crash, resulted in loss of 
faith in financial information published and, along with increasing corporate size, made 
the need for auditing even greater (Porter et al., 2005). Financial statements auditing 
was made obligatory in 1943 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in USA 
and 1948 by the Company's Act in UK. Increase in transactions' number and complexity 
is, according to Davies et al. (1999), another reason for the development of audit's 
content. Salehi (2007) reports that, during the mid 80s, reliance on internal audit sys-
tems became greater. This, according to Porter et al. (2005) was favored by the in-
crease in transactions' automation. 
Since 1990, the major factor of audit development is globalization. Porter et al. (2005) 
note that, nowadays, the most important feature of auditing is incorporation of risk. 
The authors report also that fraud has become increasingly popular, thus forcing audit 
to put more focus on this issue. Action taken (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) to deal with 
major corporate fraud scandals, like those at Worldcom and Enron, prove that pre-
venting fraud has become an increasingly important topic for auditors.  
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Criteria of exception from mandatory auditing 
Despite the obvious importance of auditing, not all companies are obliged to perform 
it. For instance, the application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
formerly International Accounting Standards (IAS), is synonymous with obligatory au-
diting. However, firms not adopting IFRS, are or are not forced to execute formal audit-
ing depending on several factors of which legislation is the most important one. For 
instance, UK's legislation required all companies to audit their financial statements, 
however this has recently changed. Nowadays a privately held company may be ex-
cepted from mandatory auditing of financial statements if at least two of the following 
three criteria are met simultaneously: a) sales < £5.6 million, b) assets < £2.8 million, 
and c) employees < 50 (Dedman et al., 2014). According to GrantThornton (2015), the 
sales (assets) threshold value is expected to increase to £10.2 (£5.1) million after Janu-
ary 1st, 2016 (the threshold value regarding the number of employees is not expected 
to change).  
With respect to Greece, the European Directive 2013/34 which has been adopted by 
Greek legislation states that companies may choose not to audit their financial state-
ments if two of the following are valid: a) sales no more than €5 million, b) assets no 
more than €2.5 million, and c) number of employees no more than 50. It must be not-
ed that these criteria apply only to companies that do not publish their financial 
statements according to IFRS and are not “public interest entities”, i.e.: a) companies 
with listed securities in EU, b) financial institutions including insurance companies, and 
c) companies considered of major public impact-interest (e.g. due to their nature of 
operations) (Mitrellos, 2014).  
Similar criteria are used to exempt EU companies from auditing, however a complete 
analysis is beyond this study's scope. Readers can find a complete list of exemption 
criteria on Crowe Horwath's website2. 
                                                     
2 www.crowehorwath.net 
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Theories of Voluntary Audit 
By definition, voluntary audit is a matter of choice and does not stem from legal or 
other formal obligations. A number of theories has so far been proposed for explaining 
why companies choose to voluntarily audit not only their financial reports but also 
their operations. Relevant literature has classified relevant theories into three major 
groups: a) agency factors, b) management factors, and c) signaling factors. In what fol-
lows, we briefly review each theory. 
Agency factors 
Agency theory has its origins in the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). In brief, the 
theory explains the reasons, effects, and means of dealing with the conflict between 
owners and managers. Company owners are capital providers and, in this way, they 
pursue wealth maximization. Managers are or, more precisely, are supposed to be 
owners' agents, i.e. persons acting in owners' best interest. However, maximizing 
owners' wealth is not always synonymous to maximizing managers' wealth and, hence, 
a conflict between the two parties arises. Such conflicts are costly to resolve and, thus, 
decrease corporate value and, by extension, owners' wealth. 
Agency theory is further expanded to include conflicts between groups with similar 
characteristics, e.g. institutional investors vs. non-institutional investors, upper level 
managers vs. lower level managers and so on. A particularly interesting part of rele-
vant theory applies to family owned (and, also, controlled) companies. In general, 
these companies are expected to be associated with lower agency costs because of 
ownership concentration and the fact that family members usually act as a single own-
er.  However, in cases where family members do not fully control the company, agency 
conflicts can also be costly (Carey et al., 2000). 
The bottom line of agency conflict relates to the consumption of free cash flow, i.e. 
cash flow available after all positive net present value projects (investments) have 
been undertaken. As previously mentioned, dealing with this conflict, as with any oth-
er economic conflict, is costly and relevant costs decrease firm value. Thus, the basic 
question becomes “how to resolve agency conflicts with zero cost”? Several solutions 
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have been proposed, among which: a) the use of debt financing that poses pressure to 
managers to achieve higher performance and b) the alignment of both owners and 
managers' interests through connecting management's reward to organizational per-
formance (e.g. providing corporate stocks to managers so that they seek corporate 
value maximization). Auditing and internal controls can also play a major role in con-
trolling the use of financial resources. Thus, owners may voluntarily choose to impose 
auditing in order to assure that financial resources are consumed to their (i.e. the 
owners') best interest. Simply put, auditing can serve as owners' defensive mechanism 
against managers' self-serving incentives. With respect to family owned companies, 
Carey et al. (2000) suggest that auditing may be used to resolve both the conflict be-
tween managers and owners and that between family and non-family owners. Hay and 
Davis (2004) also note that the choice of voluntary auditing is expected to be more 
probable in cases where agency costs are (expected to be) higher. 
Management factors 
The theory relating to management factors interprets voluntary auditing as the result 
of precautionary action. As Collis et al. (2004) note, “the demand for external audit 
may be attributable to management's need for a check on internal controls” (p.90). 
Normally, companies exempted from mandatory auditing are expected not to have 
internal auditing procedures because of either the absence of respective requirements 
by reporting standards (e.g. IFRS) or the lack of financial resources to permanently deal 
with auditing costs. The lack of internal control systems increases both inherent risk 
and control risk. Inherent risk consists of material misstatement arising while control 
risk has to do with the ability to detect such misstatement. Thus, external (voluntary) 
auditing may serve as protection mechanism against these risks.  
Inherent and control risks are natural effects of internal inefficiencies. To explain, a low 
degree of automation will normally be associated with a higher probability of both 
committing and preventing misstatements due to lack of precautionary measures. 
However, there exists a case where misstatements are not the result of “natural” 
causes or environmental conditions but stem from illegitimate human behavior. As 
Collis (2010) indicates, managers may wish to voluntarily audit not only financial 
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statements but also the organization as whole in order to prevent fraud. Although, au-
dit is not supposed to successfully deal with fraud, Collis' opinion is supported by sev-
eral other authors, among which Guntert (2000) and Ramos (2003). From a theoretical 
point of view, inherent risk, control risk, and risk of fraud are expected to increase with 
organizational levels because as, Abdel-Khalik (1993) explains, “the reduced observa-
bility in hierarchies gives rise to the risk of moral hazard and opportunism” (p.35). The 
author attributes this phenomenon to three factors. First, the longer the distance be-
tween someone and their subordinates, the weaker the ability of the former to ob-
serve the latter. Second, more levels of hierarchy are associated with higher probabil-
ity of message distortion in the sense of changing the original message till it gets to its 
final destination (receiver) because of filtering (summarization, misinterpretation, or 
even intentional manipulation). Third, a large number of hierarchical levels can lead to 
information being “ping-ponged” between different layers (the “this is not my job” 
case). Based on the above, importing external monitoring systems is of particular sig-
nificance to small companies that usually lack the resources necessary to establish 
complete internal control systems. 
It must be noted that voluntary audit may be in fact imposed by contractual agree-
ments, e.g. loan covenants. In this case, audit is used as resolving mechanism to the 
conflict between creditors (usually banks) and the ownership and/ or management 
(Collis et al., 2004). 
Signaling  
Signaling essentially consists of using means to decrease information asymmetries be-
tween insiders and outsiders. Information asymmetries exist because managers who 
run the business know a lot more than other stakeholders, e.g. owners, creditors, and 
customers, with respect to a firm's current financial performance and future prospects. 
Assuming that managers pursue value maximization, they have an incentive to signal 
positive future prospects that will increase firm value. To do so, however, they need to 
use several convincing mechanisms such as debt financing or dividend distribution. 
Debt financing can be interpreted as sign of positive future performance as it is widely 
believed that creditors and, especially banks and bondholders who are viewed as “spe-
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cialists”, would not provide capital to a company facing high probability of default. Div-
idend distribution operates in a similar way. Provided that dividends, once distributed, 
are difficult to decrease, increasing dividends yields information on the ability of the 
company to keep up with them in the future. Otherwise stated, managers signal their 
belief in the company's future prospects.  
Among others, Willenborg (1999) suggests that voluntary audit may serve as signaling 
device. The reasoning behind this statement is quite simple. If a company has the right 
not to be audited but chooses to be so, its performance is such that there exists no 
“fear” of auditing. Otherwise stated, financial statements are (seen as) more objective 
or trustworthy than non-audited ones. Consequently, objections to financial perfor-
mance on behalf of external stakeholders may, thus, be limited. This is particularly im-
portant for non-listed companies because the absence of publicly traded stocks de-
creases information that can be used by outsiders to evaluate a firm's financial per-
formance. Dedman and Kausar (2012) also report that voluntary audit may help pri-
vately held companies to increase their credit scores (ratings), thus increasing their ac-
cess to and lowering the cost of debt financing. Hay and Davis (2004) further report 
that signaling can be more effective depending on auditor's quality. For example, being 
audited by a Big 4 auditor would increase the positive effect of voluntary audit com-
pared to being audited by an auditor that does not belong to the group of Big 4s. Simi-
larly, the authors report that a number of factors relating to auditor's qualifications, 
reputation and so may also be significant in increasing voluntary audit's benefits. 
Relevant Empirical Findings and Hypotheses Development 
A number of variables have been used to test theories earlier reported. In this section 
we focus on the relationship between each variable and the choice of voluntary audit. 
It must be noted that some variables are used to account for different theoretical con-
siderations. For example, debt financing may be examined to test agency theory in the 
sense that auditing may be imposed by creditors but, at the same time, it may be used 
to test signaling theory. Where necessary, we provide with appropriate explanations. 
Additionally, we must note that it is practically impossible to report all variables so far 
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examined in order to explain why companies choose voluntary audit. Hence, the focus 
is on most often reported variables.  
Size 
Size has been basically used as a proxy of management factors, agency conflicts, and 
the benefits and costs of voluntary audit. Relevant theory suggests that size is positive-
ly related to voluntary audit in the sense that larger firms naturally suffer from more 
serious control and agency problems (due to both the resources available and the diffi-
culty of efficiently controlling them) than smaller ones. Furthermore, it is expected 
that the greater the firm, the higher the expected benefit of voluntary audit and the 
lower is (relative) cost. With respect to variables used to measure size, all but few 
studies reported below consider the number of employees, the value of total assets, 
and total turnover to approximate size.  
Abdel-Khalik (1993) finds that size is positively related to voluntary audit because larg-
er firms have more wealth at risk and, thus, a greater incentive to ask for voluntary 
audit. Evidence reported by Carey et al. (2000) leads to conclude that size is not signifi-
cantly correlated with the existence of external auditing in family businesses, a finding 
largely not consistent with relevant literature. Collis et al. (2004) conclude that size is 
positively related to demand for external audit, however this conclusion largely de-
pends on the measure used (only turnover proves to be significantly related to de-
mand for external audit). Furthermore, the authors report that size is not the most sig-
nificant variable in explaining demand for external audit. According to Collis' (2010) 
empirical findings, size is significantly and positively related to voluntary audit and this 
conclusion is robust across three different samples (UK firms, Danish firms, and their 
combined sample). Collis (2012) also finds that size is significantly and positively relat-
ed to demand for voluntary external audit and this finding is valid both for the sample 
of small companies and the sample of large ones. Dedman et al. (2014) find that size is 
significantly and positively related to voluntary audit.  
The above evidence suggest that most studies find a significant and positive relation 
between size and voluntary audit. This leads us to form the following Hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Firm size is significantly and positively related to voluntary audit. 
Debt  
Debt is used to account for agency and signaling factors. Contrary to what was report-
ed earlier for size, it seems that there is no universal agreement regarding debt's 
measurement. In particular, Abdel-Khalik (1993) uses a dummy variable to account for 
lender's demand for auditing that takes the value of 1 if lenders demand voluntary au-
dit and 0 otherwise. A similar variable is used by Collis et al. (2004) and Collis (2010). In 
particular, their dummy takes the value of 1 if statutory accounts are given to creditors 
(banks) and 0 otherwise. Collis (2012) also uses a dummy to account for the effect of 
debt but, in this case, the value of 1 is given if the audited firm's managers believe that 
lenders (and other stakeholders) as well use the firm's financial statement. Carey et al. 
(2000), Hay and Davis (2004), Lennox and Pittman (2011), Dedman and Kausar (2012), 
and Dedman et al. (2014) use the debt to assets ratio. 
Debt is found to be positively related to demand for auditing by Abdel-Khalik (1993) 
who further explains that lenders' demand for auditing is positively related to wealth 
at risk and, thus, companies are more willing to opt for audit when their creditors ask 
for it. According to evidence reported by Carey et al. (2000), debt financing is positively 
related to voluntary demand for external audit by family owned companies. As the au-
thors explain, this is attributed to the fact that, in the presence of more debt financing, 
stockholders have strongest incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders. Thus, au-
dit is necessary to resolve the (more intense) conflict between the two stakeholder 
groups. Hay and Davis (2004) find that debt financing is positively related to the choice 
of qualified versus non-qualified accountants to serve as auditors. This means that in-
creasing debt financing also increases the need for auditing of higher quality to deal 
with agency issues between owners and creditors. Collis et al. (2004) also find a posi-
tive relationship between debt and voluntary audit and explain that the desire for non-
mandatory audit is positively associated with companies with agency relationships 
with lenders and, thus, voluntary audit is seen as means of maintaining good relations 
with lenders. Collis (2010) reports rather mixed evidence. In more detail, although 
debt is positively related to voluntary audit both in UK and Denmark, the respective 
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relationship is significant (to an acceptable level) only within Danish firms indicating 
that differences may exist among different contexts (in this case countries). Evidence 
reported by Collis (2012), shows that the perception of managers that creditors re-
quire audited accounts is significantly and positively related to demand for voluntary 
audit. As the author explains: “small companies are likely to have fewer assets and/ or 
a shorter track record with which to demonstrate the success... and audited accounts 
may mitigate the risk to banks”. Dedman et al. (2014) provide evidence suggesting that 
leverage is not a significant predictor of company's decision to undergo a voluntary 
audit. Although this conclusion depends on the sample examined, it must be noted 
that it is valid in most cases (in two out of three years and in the full, three year, sam-
ple).  
It is then concluded that, with minor exceptions, that both the presence of debt financ-
ing and the extent to which a company uses debt financing, is significantly and posi-
tively related to voluntary audit. Consequently, our second research hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Debt is significantly and positively related to voluntary audit. 
Family ownership 
Family ownership relates to agency theory and is measured by dummy variables, i.e. 
variables that take the value of 1 if a company is wholly family owned and 0 otherwise. 
Results by Collis et al. (2004), Collis (2010), and Collis (2012) suggest that family own-
ership is significantly and negatively related to the demand for voluntary audit which 
means that wholly family owned companies are less probable to seek voluntary audit 
because agency conflicts are weaker (since there exist no other stockholders) and thus 
the need for audit as mechanism to resolve agency conflicts is not extensive. The effect 
of family ownership on voluntary audit is indirectly investigated by Carey et al. (2000). 
The authors find that, in family owned businesses, the relation between internal and 
external audit is significant and negative suggesting that companies pursuing internal 
audit are less likely to demand external audit as well. 
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The above evidence suggests that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
voluntary audit. Simply put, the more owners, the higher the probability of a firm be-
ing voluntarily audited. Similarly, the more power of controlling shareholders the less 
probable is for a company to be voluntarily audited. Provided that small ownership 
has, by definition, little impact in corporate decisions and/ or conflicts, our next hy-
pothesis considers solely controlling shareholders and is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The controlling shareholder's stake is significantly and negatively related 
to voluntary audit. 
Financial performance 
Financial performance measures include variables such as revenue structure, the ratio 
of salaries and wages to sales (Hay and Davis, 2004), liquidity (Lennox and Pittman, 
2011), and interest coverage (Lennox and Pittman, 2011; Dedman et al., 2014). Finan-
cial performance is measured using both continuous (scale) and dummy variables. For 
example, Lennox and Pittman (2011) define interest coverage as “interest expenses 
divided by earnings before interest and taxes” while Dedman et al. (2014) use a dum-
my variable that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of profit before interest and taxes to 
interest expenses exceeds 1 and 0 otherwise. Hay and Davis (2004) found that, in gen-
eral, the ratio of salaries and wages to sales is significantly and positively related to 
audit fees. By contrast, their findings show that the donations and grants as portion of 
revenues are positively but insignificantly related to audit fees. Liquidity (defined as 
the quick ratio) has been found to be significantly and positively correlated to the 
choice of a company to abandon voluntary audit, i.e. the better the liquidity the higher 
the probability that the company no longer continues to be voluntarily audited. This 
finding may suggest that companies with more financial strength, at least in terms of 
liquidity, have limited incentives to use voluntary audit as signaling device in order to 
signal their wealth (Lennox and Pittman, 2011). Lennox and Pittman (2011) report a 
significant and negative correlation between “interest expenses divided by earnings 
before interest and taxes” and a company's choice to abandon voluntary audit. Hence, 
lower interest coverage is associated with more need for signaling and, therefore, vol-
untary audit. This conclusion is also supported by Dedman et al. (2014) with minor ex-
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ceptions but the respective relation is insignificant in all cases (the authors examine 
four different samples). 
It is then obvious that financial strength is negatively related to voluntary audit. This is 
somewhat “natural”, at least within the context of signaling theory. Simply put, in-
creased financial strength limits the need to use voluntary audit as means to external-
ize positive news about a firm's financial condition. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Financial performance is significantly and negatively related to voluntary 
audit. 
Audit Characteristics 
Audit characteristics include variables such as audit cost, auditor's level of education 
etc. Collis (2010) finds that the cost of audit (approximated by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if company managers agree that the cost of audit is a substantial 
expense and 0 otherwise) is negatively related to the demand for voluntary audit 
showing that the more costly external auditing is perceived, the lower the probability 
that a company will go for it. However, the respective relationship is significant for UK 
firms but insignificant for Danish firms. Dedman et al. (2014) conclude the exact oppo-
site. In their study, audit fees are measured by a continuous variable (particularly: the 
natural logarithm of audit fees) and found to be significantly and positively related to 
the demand for voluntary audit (this finding is valid in four different samples). Simply 
put, the more costly the audit, the higher the probability that the company will go for 
it. This controversy of findings could possible yield that different measurements (i.e. 
perception of cost versus actual cost) may be responsible for extremely different con-
clusions. Collis et al. (2004) report that the perceived (by the company's managers) ne-
cessity and quality of voluntary audit are significantly and positively related to the de-
mand for voluntary audit. This implies that the choice to be voluntarily audited results, 
among others, by the degree to which managers believe that voluntary audit is both 
necessary and expected to increase the quality of financial information. Collis (2010) 
and Collis (2012) report identical evidence although evidence reported by Collis (2012) 
is valid only for part of the sample studied (particularly: for small companies). Finally, 
Dedman et al. (2014) report that, in most cases (in 3 out of 4 different samples of 
  -15- 
firms), a firm audited by a “Big-4” auditor in a particular year is more probable of 
choosing to be voluntary audited in subsequent years. This could be interpreted as cer-
tainty, on behalf of the audited company, that the voluntary audit will not question the 
quality of the company's financial information. 
Contrary to the rest of variables reported in this section, audit characteristics seem to 
provide with case sensitive evidence. Furthermore, sensitiveness depends both on 
measures (variables) used and samples considered. It is then preferable to leave the 
last research hypothesis “open”, i.e. to make no statement on the direction of rela-
tionship between voluntary audit and audit characteristics. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5: Audit characteristics are significantly related to voluntary audit. 
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Empirical Research 
This chapter deals with the empirical investigation of factors affecting demand for vol-
untary audit. Variables used are first presented followed by description of statical 
models. Sampling procedure is then explained. The chapter continues with the analysis 
and discussion of relevant findings. 
Variables 
Hypothesis 1 deals with corporate size. In line with almost all empirical studies so far 
reported, we use total assets, turnover, and the number of employees to measure size. 
LN_A  Natural logarithm of total assets 
LN_S  Natural logarithm of total turnover (sales) 
LN_E  Natural logarithm of the number of employees 
To account for debt (Hypothesis 2), we adopt the approach of Carey et al. (2000), Hay 
and Davis (2004), Lennox and Pittman (2011), Dedman and Kausar (2012), and Dedman 
et al. (2014) that use the debt to assets ratio. However, a note should be made. Using 
only the total gearing ratio is associated with the risk of not being able to distinguish 
between creditors who have the power to ask for audited financial reports (e.g. banks) 
and those who don't (e.g. accounts payable or other operating liabilities). Simply put, a 
gearing ratio of 2 is very differently interpreted when long-term liabilities account for 
the greatest part of total liabilities than when long-term liabilities are minimal. Nor-
mally, the former case refers to a situation where creditors (e.g. banks and bondhold-
ers) have more power to “impose” voluntary audit than the latter one (where accounts 
payable and similar accounts form the greatest part of total liabilities). 
GEAR  Total liabilities / Total Assets,  to account for the extent of gearing 
GEAR_S Non-current liabilities / Current liabilities,  to account for gearing' struc-
ture (long-term vs. short term liabilities) 
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Concentration of family ownership (Hypothesis 4) is usually measured, as, for example, 
in Collis et al. (2004), Collis (2010), and Collis (2012), by dummy variables, e.g. 1 if the 
company is wholly family controlled and 0 otherwise. However, our focus is on a more 
general approach of ownership concentration. To explain, we are interested in con-
flicts that could arise between all major shareholders and not just between family 
members and the rest of shareholders. Agency conflicts are expected to be more in-
tense in the presence of more major shareholders, i.e. more “stakes” are expected to 
lead to more conflicts. For example, it is more difficult to deal with 5 different parts 
than to deal with 2 parts. Similarly, agency conflicts are expected to depend on major 
shareholders' power. To explain, a situation where a company's equity is equally divid-
ed among 3 major shareholders (each with 33% of stocks) is expected to be associated 
with more severe agency conflicts compared to a situation where three shareholders 
own 80%, 10%, and 10%, respectively. In the latter case, the dominant shareholder 
may exhibit almost absolute control over company decisions. Consequently, we exam-
ine both the quantitative and qualitative part of ownership concentration (number of 
controlling shareholders and stake of controlling shareholders. Consequently: 
N_CSH  Number of controlling shareholders 
S_CSH  Stake of controlling shareholders (as %) 
Financial performance is approximated by four aspects. Following Lennox and Pittman 
(2011) we account for liquidity. Additionally, we examine interest coverage as in Len-
nox and Pittman (2011) and Dedman et al. (2014). Two more aspects, namely profita-
bility and asset utilization, are added to provide with a more complete picture of finan-
cial “strength”. Before proceeding with variable definition, a note on the inclusion of 
asset utilization should be made. As will be reported latter on, our sample consists of 
retailers and manufacturers (i.e. the service industry is excluded from the analysis) 
whose assets consists, due to their nature of operations, largely by tangible assets (in-
clusive of inventories). Asset utilization was, therefore, considered an important aspect 
of financial performance.  
CURRENT Current ratio 
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EBIT  Earnings before interest and taxes margin 
INT_CON Interest coverage 
TURNOVER Net assets turnover 
Hypothesis 5 relates to audit characteristics. Due to lack of relevant data, we are only 
able to focus on two relevant aspects. First, we examine whether the audit is per-
formed by a “Big-4” auditor as in Dedman et al. (2014). Additionally, we use a variable 
to account for audits done by audit companies versus audits by independent auditors 
(members of SOEL, the body of independent auditors in Greece). Although relevant 
data are not available, it is expected that the cost of audit by an independent auditor 
will be somehow lower than the respective cost arising from audits by auditing com-
panies. 
BIG4  1 if audit is performed by one of the “BIG-4” audit firms and 0 otherwise 
IDENTITY 1 if audit is made by an audit company and 0 if an independent certified 
  auditor performs the audit. 
Methods  
Logistic regression has been used by most of relevant studies reviewed in this study, 
e.g. Carrey et al. (2000), Collis et al. (2004), Hay and Davis (2004), Collis (2010), and 
Collis (2012). Its basic advantage lies in the fact that any kind of independent variable 
(continuous, dichotomous, and so on) can be used to estimate an event's probability, 
in our case the probability of being voluntarily audited. Hence, the dependent variable 
(labeled AUDIT) takes the value of 1 if the company has been voluntarily audited and 0 
otherwise. The following basic models will be estimated: 
Model 1: AUDIT t = LN_A t + GEAR t + GEAR_S t + N_CSH t + S_CSH t + CURRENT t + 
  EBIT t + INT_CON t + TURNOVER t  
Model 2: AUDIT t = LN_S t + GEAR t + GEAR_S t + N_CSH t + S_CSH t + CURRENT t + 
  EBIT t + INT_CON t + TURNOVER t  
  -19- 
Model 3: AUDIT t = LN_E t + GEAR t + GEAR_S t + N_CSH t + S_CSH t + CURRENT t + 
  EBIT t + INT_CON t + TURNOVER t  
Basic models are estimated for 2014. This is due to data availability which will be fur-
ther explained latter on. Apart from these models, it will be investigated whether tim-
ing effects do exist. To explain, the choice of being voluntarily audited in year “t” will 
be regressed upon independent variables in year “t-1” to check whether the respective 
choice can be explained by existing size, debt and other independent variables. Alter-
native models are as follows: 
Model 4: AUDIT t = LN_A t-1 + GEAR t-1 + GEAR_S t-1 + CURRENT t-1 + EBIT t-1 +  
  INT_CON t-1 + TURNOVER t-1 
Model 5: AUDIT t = LN_S t-1 + GEAR t-1 + GEAR_S t-1 + CURRENT t-1 + EBIT t-1 +  
  INT_CON t-1 + TURNOVER t-1  
Model 6: AUDIT t = LN_E t-1 + GEAR t-1 + GEAR_S t-1 + CURRENT t-1 + EBIT t-1 +  
  INT_CON t-1 + TURNOVER t-1. 
Alternative models are estimated for 2014, i.e. independent variables come from 2013. 
Note that N_CSH and S_CSH are omitted from the analysis due to missing data for 
2013 (refer to next section).  
Goodness of fit tests will be used to test for differences between the proportion of au-
dited and unaudited firms across all samples (see further details on the following sec-
tion). Cross tabulation (chi-square tests) will be used to test for the effect of BIG4 and 
IDENTITY. In particular, it will be examined whether the proportion of voluntarily au-
dited firms by a “Big-4” auditor significantly differs from the proportion of voluntarily 
audited firms by a non “Big-4” auditor. The same tests will be used to examine the ef-
fect of IDENTITY on voluntary audit. Similarly, retailers and manufacturers will be com-
pared in terms of proportion of audited firms to reveal any effect of industry on the 
decision to be voluntarily audited. Readers should already have noted that BIG4 and 
IDENTITY are not included in the set of independent variables for regression models. 
The reason for this is obvious. To explain, values of BIG4 and IDENTITY are missing for 
unaudited firms: BIG4 and IDENTITY values are available only for audited firms. Finally, 
  -20- 
the notations “_14” and “_13” will be used denoted that data come from 2014 and 
2013, respectively. 
Sampling 
To construct the sample used, the Amadeus database (amadeus.bvdinfo.com) was 
used. Sampled firms come from Greece and two broad groups, namely retailers and 
manufacturers, in order to allow for conclusions regarding the effect of type of opera-
tions on the decision to perform voluntary audit. The sampling procedure is described 
below.  
The first criterion used concerns the country of origin (Greece). The inclusion of loca-
tion returned a total of 24,112 firms. Next, results were limited to “manufacturing” 
(codes 31, 32, and 33 on the Amadeus database) and “retail trade” (codes 44 and 45 
on the Amadeus database) companies only3. After including this criterion, the number 
of firms was limited to 6,466. Next, we included the criterion of turnover to include 
companies with turnover of no more than €5 million in 2014, 2013, 20124. The same 
procedure was followed for total assets (threshold: €2.5 in 2014, 2013, or 2012) and 
number of employees (threshold: 50 in 2014, 2013, and 2012). After these steps, the 
number of sampled firms was limited to 5,217. It must be noted that including all three 
criteria, instead of at least two, does not significantly alter the number of sampled 
companies. In particular, if the turnover criterion is only used, the number of firms is 
6,438. Adding the criterion regarding total assets leads to 6,437 firms. Thus, approxi-
mately 5 out of 6 companies (5,217 from 6,438) satisfy all three criteria simultaneous-
ly. Next, only unlisted companies were considered to avoid including companies for 
which audit is mandatory (listed firms in Greece are required to adopt IFRS). The num-
                                                     
3 Amadeus uses the NACE (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities 
in the European Community) for 2012. 
4 Despite data from 2012 are not examined, this year was considered to 
assure that companies were classified as SMEs in at least one out of three most recent 
years with available data. 
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ber of firms decreased from 5,217 to 5,208 (only 9 firms were dropped out). This is 
reasonable, since listed firms do not normally satisfy the quantitative criteria used 
here to construct our sample. Finally, we limited the search to limited companies (“so-
ciete anonymes” in Greek “Anonymi Etairia”) to include only stock companies, i.e. 
companies of no other form of ownership. The number of firms samples decreased to 
4,038. 
The 4,038 firms sampled operate in 212 sub-industries some of which contain but a 
few companies (107 sub-industries include less than 10 companies each). It was, thus, 
decided to set a minimum size requirement for a sub-industry to be included in the 
final sample. Excluding industries with no more than 30 firms leads to a new sample of 
2,306 firms operating in 32 sub-industries: 1,560 (67.6%) manufacturers and 746 
(32.4%) retailers.  
Table 1: Structure of sampled firms 
NACE code5 Description N % of total 
MANUFACTURING 1,560 67.6 
1011 Processing and preserving of meat  63 2.7 
1039 Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  143 6.2 
1041  Manufacture of oils and fats  86 3.7 
1051 Operation of dairies and cheese making 78 3.4 
1061 Manufacture of grain mill products  38 1.6 
1071 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes  84 3.6 
1089 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 40 1.7 
1091 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 35 1.5 
1102 Manufacture of wine from grape  71 3.1 
1413 Manufacture of other outerwear 84 3.6 
1610 Sawmilling and planing of wood 33 1.4 
1721 Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers 
of paper and paperboard 
45 2.0 
1812 Other printing  84 3.6 
                                                     
5  Codes based on NACE. Further details can be found on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/nace_all.html 
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2059 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.  34 1.5 
2222 Manufacture of plastic packing goods 66 2.9 
2229 Manufacture of other plastic products  48 2.1 
2363 Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete  123 5.3 
2370  Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  74 3.2 
2511 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures  108 4.7 
2512  Manufacture of doors and windows of metal  55 2.4 
2599 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c 52 2.3 
2712 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus  31 1.3 
3109 Manufacture of other furniture  52 2.3 
3299 Other manufacturing n.e.c.  33 1.4 
RETAIL 746 32.4 
4511 Sale of cars and light motor vehicles  243 10.5 
4532  Retail trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories  34 1.5 
4711 Retail sale in non-specialized stores with food, beverages or tobacco 
predominating  
67 2.9 
4752 Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass in specialized stores  107 4.6 
4754 Retail sale of electrical household appliances in specialized stores  68 2.9 
4759 Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment and other household 
articles in specialized stores  
70 3.0 
4771 Retail sale of clothing in specialized stores  125 5.4 
4775 Retail sale of cosmetic and toilet articles in specialized stores  32 1.4 
 TOTAL 2,306 100 
 
It must be noted that the number of firms examined in the rest of the study will not 
always be equal to 2,306 due to some missing data. 
The following table reports the proportion of audited and unaudited firms (AUDIT_14) 
in the sample of manufacturers, retailers, and all firms along with the results of respec-
tive goodness-of-fit (chi-square) test. 
Table 2: Proportion of voluntarily audited and unaudited firms 
 MANUFACTURERS RETAILERS TOTAL 
Unaudited 1288 631 1919 
Audited 272 115 387 
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Total 1560 746 2306 
Chi-Square 661.703 356.912 1017.79 
df 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .000 
 
The table above suggests that the majority of Greek firms do not chose to be voluntari-
ly audited. In particular only 17.4% of manufacturers, 15.4% of retailers, and 16.8% of 
all firms chose to be voluntarily audited. The difference between the proportion of 
voluntarily audited firms and unaudited firms is significant in all samples studied (chi-
square sig. = 0.000 < 0.05 in all samples). Thus, it is concluded that voluntary audit is 
not a choice for the majority of firms irrespective of the industry they operate in. Re-
sults for cross tabulation (Pearson's chi-square) for the effect of industry on being vol-
untarily audited are reported on the following table. 
Table 3: Effect of industry on the decision to be voluntarily audited  
 MANUFACTURERS RETAILERS 
TOTA
L 
Unaudited 1288 631 1919 
Audited 272 115 387 
Total 1560 746 2306 
 Value 1.475  
Pearson Chi-Square df 1  
 Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.225  
 
As expected, the effect of industry on audit choices is not significant. In more detail, it 
is noted that the proportion of manufacturers choosing to be voluntarily audited 
(272/1560 = 17.4%) is not significantly different to that of retailers voluntarily audited 
(115/746 = 15.4%) as evidenced by the chi-square test (chi-square sig. = 0.225 > 0.05).  
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Findings  
Descriptive statistics 
We begin our analysis by reporting descriptive statistics for independent variables. De-
scriptive statistics are reported separately for audited (the respective sample is denot-
ed “A”) and unaudited firms (the respective sample is denoted “UN”). For each sample, 
we report the number of cases (N), mean (M), median (ME), and standard deviation 
(SD). The hypothesis of normal distribution is tested with the Shapiro-Wilk test (de-
grees of freedom are omitted because, by definition, they are equal to the number of 
cases). “SW-st” and “SW-sig” are used to denote the test's statistic and significance, 
respectively. The following table refers to size variables in 2014 and 2013 (LN_A_14, 
LN_A_13, LN_S_14, LN_S_13, LN_E_14, and LN_E_13).   
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and normality tests: size variables 
  LN_A_14 LN_A_13 LN_S_14 LN_S_13 LN_E_14 LN_E_13 
UN 
N 1200 1748 1197 1741 1145 1635 
M 14.410 14.408 13.763 13.716 2.343 2.299 
ME 14.381 14.376 13.899 13.805 2.398 2.303 
SD 0.941 0.935 1.222 1.174 0.821 0.799 
SW-st 0.993 0.995 0.954 0.962 0.983 0.982 
SW-sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 
N 284 370 283 368 280 362 
M 15.578 15.573 15.421 15.378 3.229 3.196 
ME 15.556 15.566 15.505 15.459 3.401 3.350 
SD 0.813 0.875 0.965 1.006 0.640 0.665 
SW-st 0.995 0.991 0.965 0.942 0.931 0.928 
SW-sig. 0.409 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
First of all, we note that the assumption of normality is rejected in all but one case 
(LN_A_14 for audited firms) given that SW-sig is less than 0.05. Consequently, median 
values should be used to describe the central tendency of variables. With respect to 
  -25- 
unaudited firms, we note that size, in terms of assets, slightly increases from 1.752$ 
million to 1.76$ million, a change of 0.5%. Same conclusions are drawn when size is 
measured in terms of sales and number of employees (increase of 9.9% and 10%, re-
spectively). Size of audited firms also increases but only in terms of sales and number 
of employees (4.7% and 5.2%, respectively). However, when size is measured in terms 
of assets, we note a negative change from 5.76$ million to 5.7$ million (a decrease of 
1%). As far as the differences between the two groups are concerned, audited firms 
are larger than unaudited ones and this finding is valid irrespective of the measure 
and/ or year considered. It must also be noted that the respective percentage differ-
ences are quite large ranging from 172.6% (number of employees in 2014) to 422.% 
(sales in 2013). Given that the assumption of normality is rejected in all pairs of varia-
bles, we use the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) test to test for the difference of median 
values between the two groups. The respective results are reported on the following 
table. 
Table 5: Test for the significance of median difference between audited and unaudited firms: 
size variables 
 Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
LN_A_14 57675 778275 -17.358 0.000 
LN_A_13 112349 1640975 -19.747 0.000 
LN_S_14 41591 758594 -19.763 0.000 
LN_S_13 76160 1592571 -23.006 0.000 
LN_E_14 62662 718747 -15.829 0.000 
LN_E_13 112736 1450166 -18.469 0.000 
  
As expected based on findings earlier reported, differences between the two groups in 
terms of median size are significant for all measures and/ or years considered (the 
test's significance is always less 5%). Consequently, audited firms are larger than unau-
dited ones and, at this point, we may not rejected Hypothesis 1 “Firm size is signifi-
cantly and positively related to voluntary audit”. 
  -26- 
The following table reports descriptive statistics and normality tests for debt variables 
in 2014 and 2013 (GEAR_14, GEAR_13, GEAR_S_14, and GEAR_S_13). 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics and normality tests: debt variables 
  GEAR_14 GEAR_13 GEAR_S_14 GEAR_S_13 
UN 
N 1200 1748 1199 1746 
M 0.576 0.571 0.634 0.660 
ME 0.545 0.548 0.033 0.027 
SD 0.414 0.375 2.288 5.450 
SW-st 0.797 0.858 0.249 0.061 
SW-sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 
N 284 370 284 370 
M 0.605 0.636 0.293 0.452 
ME 0.587 0.606 0.080 0.068 
SD 0.566 0.602 0.505 1.585 
SW-st 0.469 0.468 0.629 0.251 
SW-sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
As with size variables, the normal distribution assumption of debt variables is also re-
jected in all cases (variables and years). Thus, our focus in on median values. The table 
above shows that the gearing ratio decreases for both audited and unaudited firms 
(from 54.8% to 54.5% and 60.6% to 58.7%, respectively). This means that both groups 
of firm decreased their gearing from 2013 to 2014, possibly as the result of the recent 
economic downturn in Greece. As far as the relation between long-term and short-
term liabilities is considered, it is evident that both groups of firms rely more on long-
term liabilities in 2014. In particular, the ratio of non-current liabilities to current liabil-
ities increases from 2.7% to 3.3% for unaudited firms and from 6.8% to 8% for audited 
ones. This finding could further imply that the recent economic crisis decreased trade 
credits (included in current liabilities) and, thus, the ratio of long- to short-term liabili-
ties increased. It must also be noted that median gearing is higher for audited firms 
(60.6% versus 54.8% in 2013 and 58.7% versus 54.5% in 2014) and audited firms rely 
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more on non-current liabilities than unaudited ones (6.8% versus 2.7% in 2013 and 8% 
versus 3.3%).  The significance of these difference is tested on the following table. 
Table 7: Test for the significance of median difference between audited and unaudited firms: 
debt variables 
 Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
GEAR_14 162831 883431 -1.166 0.244 
GEAR_13 297171 1825797 -2.452 0.014 
GEAR_S_14 158358 877758 -1.888 0.059 
GEAR_S_13 298715 1823846 -2.344 0.019 
  
The table above merely verifies earlier findings on debt variables. In particular, we 
note that the median difference is significant only for GEAR_13 and GEAR_S_13. To 
explain, the difference in median gearing is not significant in 2014 (the test significance 
is 0.244 > 0.05) but audited firms have significantly higher gearing in 2013 (the test 
significance is 0.014 < 0.05). Similarly, there is no significant difference in the 2014 ra-
tio of non-current liabilities to current liabilities (the test significance is 0.059 > 0.05) 
but audited firms rely more on long-term liabilities compared to unaudited ones in 
2013 (the test significance is 0.019 < 0.05). In short, the two groups differ in terms of 
debt variables in the year before the audit is performed but not in the year of audit. 
Thus, with some reservation we may not rejected Hypothesis 2 “Debt is significantly 
and positively related to voluntary audit” at this point. 
The following table reports descriptive statistics and normality tests for ownership var-
iables in 2014 (N_CSH_14 and S_CSH_14). 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics and normality tests: ownership variables 
  N_CSH_14 S_CSH_14 
UN 
N 1487 745 
M 3.115 77.578 
ME 3 80.000 
SD 1.716 18.566 
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SW-st 0.735 0.884 
SW-sig 0.000 0.000 
A 
N 365 173 
M 3.189 76.190 
ME 3 76.690 
SD 2.085 20.770 
SW-st 0.681 0.878 
SW-sig. 0.000 0.000 
 
Once again, our analysis focuses on median values given that the normality assump-
tion is rejected in all cases. With respect to the number of controlling shareholders 
both groups of firms have a median value of 3 suggesting that at least half of sampled 
firms are controlled by at least 3 major shareholders. Similar conclusions are drawn for 
the share of controlling shareholders. In more detail, controlling shareholders control 
about 76.69% of audited firms and 80% of unaudited firms, a difference of 4.1%. The 
significance of respective differences is tested on the following table. 
Table 9: Test for the significance of median difference between audited and unaudited firms: 
ownership variables 
 Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
N_CSH_14 269860 1376188 -0.173 0.863 
S_CSH_14 64323 79374 -0.038 0.970 
  
As expected, none of the median differences is significant (the test's significance is al-
ways less than 5%). Consequently, at this point we find no evidence to support Hy-
pothesis 3 “The controlling shareholder's stake is significantly and negatively related to 
voluntary audit”. 
The following table reports descriptive statistics and normality tests for financial per-
formance variables in 2014 and 2013 (CURRENT_14, CURRENT_13, EBIT_14, EBIT_13, 
INT_COV_14, INT_COV_14, TURNOVER_14, and TURNOVER_13). 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics and normality tests: financial performance variables 
  
CURRENT 
_14 
CURRENT 
_13 
EBIT 
_14 
EBIT 
_13 
INT_COV 
_14 
INT_COV 
_13 
TURNOVER 
_14 
TURNOVER 
_13 
UN 
N 1196 1740 1162 1691 1048 1504 1150 1196 
M 2.73 2.63 0.4 -1.4 28.2 18.9 3.0 2.7 
ME 1.56 1.492 3.2 2.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.6 
SD 4.34 4.407 18.0 19.3 111.2 89.7 12.1 4.3 
SW-st 0.435 0.391 0.831 0.843 0.364 0.338 0.171 0.435 
SW-sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 
N 284 370 280 365 257 338 268 284 
M 2.600 2.285 2.888 2.045 24.941 24.968 4.710 2.600 
ME 1.434 1.326 3.597 3.112 2.088 1.362 1.662 1.434 
SD 4.667 3.306 14.169 12.817 83.732 96.469 21.145 4.667 
SW-st 0.384 0.479 0.758 0.797 0.365 0.324 0.140 0.384 
SW-sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
First of all, the assumption of normally distributed variables is rejected for all financial 
performance variables. With respect to liquidity, the current ratio increases for both 
groups of firms from 2013 to 2014 (from 1.492 to 1.56 for unaudited firms and from 
1.326 to 1.434 for audited ones). Keeping in mind earlier comments on trade credits, 
the increase in current ratio could be the result of diminishing current liabilities (the 
ratio's denominator) that include trade credits.  Interestingly, unaudited firms seem to 
be in better position than audited ones in terms of liquidity: their current ratio is high-
er in both 2013 (1.492 versus 1.326) and 2014 (1.56 versus 1.434). Alternatively, the 
higher current ratio for unaudited firms could be attributed to excessive inventories 
and/or other current assets (e.g. accounts receivable). Profitability, measured in terms 
of earnings before interest and taxes margin, also increases from 2013 to 2014 in both 
groups of firms (from 2.6% to 3.2% for unaudited firms and from 3.112% to 3.597% for 
audited ones). Contrary to what have been reported for liquidity, however, audited 
firms are in a better position than unaudited ones in terms of profitability: their profit 
margin is higher in both year (3.112% versus 2.6% in 2013 and 3.597% versus 3.2% in 
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2014). Similar conclusions are drawn for interest coverage that increases from 2013 to 
2014 in both groups of firms (from 1.2 to 1.4 for unaudited firms and from 1.362 to 
2.088 for audited ones). As with profitability, audited firms are in a better position in 
terms of interest coverage compared to unaudited once in both 2013 (1.362 versus 
1.2) and 2014  (2.088 versus 1.4). Findings regarding turnover of net assets are rather 
mixed. First, turnover decreases from 1.6 (in 2013) to 1 (in 2014) for unaudited firms 
but increases from 1.434 (in 2013) to 1.662 (in 2014) for audited ones. This changes 
also change the direction of difference between the two groups in terms of turnover. 
In particular, audited firms are in a worse position in terms of turnover compared to 
unaudited ones in 2013 (1.434 versus 1.6) but in a better position in 2014 (1.662 ver-
sus 1). The significance of differences between the two groups in terms of financial 
performance is tested on the following table. Once again nonparametric tests are im-
posed by non-normally distributed variables. 
Table 11: Test for the significance of median difference between audited and unaudited firms: 
financial performance variables 
 Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
CURRENT_14 158837 199307 -1.698 0.089 
CURRENT_13 294308 362943 -2.593 0.010 
EBIT_14 153152 828855 -1.523 0.128 
EBIT_13 289923 1720509 -1.817 0.069 
INT_COV_14 120329 670005 -2.649 0.008 
INT_COV_13 232321 1364081 -2.473 0.013 
TURNOVER_14 112373 774198 -6.912 0.000 
TURNOVER_13 204086 1614446 -8.792 0.000 
  
As can been seen on the table above, the two groups significantly differ in terms of fi-
nancial performance except for when profitability is examined (the test's significance is 
less than 5% in both 2013 and 2014). However, the rejection of significant median dif-
ference in terms of profitability is marginally rejected in 2013. In this case the test's 
significance is 6.9% suggesting that if the 10% level of significance is used (instead of 
the 5% threshold used so far), the two groups of firms are not significantly different to 
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each other. The same is valid for the median difference in terms of 2014 liquidity (the 
test's significance is again less than 10%). Taken together these findings suggest that, 
during the year of audit, voluntarily audited firms are in better financial position than 
unaudited ones in terms of interest coverage and turnover but no significant differ-
ence exists in terms of liquidity and profitability. In the year preceding audit, audited 
firms are in a worse financial position than unaudited ones in terms of liquidity and 
turnover but they are better off in terms of interest coverage and the two groups do 
no significantly differ in terms of profitability. These rather “mixed” evidence lead us to 
reject, with some reservations, Hypothesis 4 “Financial performance is significantly and 
negatively related to voluntary audit”.  
The following table reports evidence on the effect of audit characteristics (as meas-
ured by BIG4_14 and IDENTITY_14) on voluntary audit. The goodness-of-fit (chi-
square) test is used to test whether the proportion of firms that are audited by a “Big 
4” auditor is significantly different to the proportion of firms not audited by a “Big 4” 
auditor and, similarly, whether the proportion of firms audited by an independent au-
ditor is significantly different to the proportion of firms audited by an auditing compa-
ny. 
Table 12: Effect of audit choices on voluntary audit 
 “Big 4” auditor Independent auditor 
NO 362 206 
YES 25 181 
Total 387 387 
Chi-Square 293.46 1.615 
df 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .204 
 
The table above suggests that most of voluntarily audited firms (362 out of 387, or 
93.5%) choose not to be audited by a “Big 4” auditor and the difference between the 
proportion of firms audited by a “Big 4” auditor and those audited by a different audi-
tor is significant (chi-square sig. = 0.000 < 0.05). Thus, it is evident that most firms that 
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are voluntarily audited have their reports audited by an auditor that does not belong 
to the group of “Big 4” auditors. Additionally, we note that the choice between audit-
ing companies and independent auditors is not clear given that, approximately, 1 out 
of 2 companies (181 out of 387 or 46.7%) choose to be voluntarily audited by an inde-
pendent auditor and the difference between the proportion of firms audited by an in-
dependent auditor and that of firms audited by an auditing company is not significant 
(chi-square sig. is 0.204 > 0.05). Taken together, most audited firms do not prefer “Big 
4” auditors but there is no apparent difference in terms of preference between inde-
pendent auditors and auditing companies. Hence, at this point we should only partly 
reject (or, equivalently not reject) Hypothesis 5 “Audit characteristics are significantly 
related to voluntary audit”.   
Logistic Regression 
The following 3 tables report results for the basic models (Model 1, Model 2, and 
Model 3, respectively). For each model, the -2 log-likelihood ratio (a measure of unex-
plained variance) and Cox-Snell and Nagelkerke R-square (although they should be in-
terpreted with caution) are first reported. Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(chi-square) test is then reported to test the model's goodness-of-fit. With respect to 
independent variables, we report B-coefficients (denoted “B”), standard errors (denot-
ed “S.E.”), Wald statistic along with its significance value (denoted “Wald” and “Sig” 
respectively), and Exp(B). 
Table 13: Model 1: AUDIT_14 = LN_A_14 + GEAR_14 + GEAR_S_14 + N_CSH_14 + S_CSH_14 + 
CURRENT_14 + EBIT_14 + INT_CON_14 + TURNOVER_14 
Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
330.825 0.261 0.417    
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig.    
3.011 8 0.934    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
LN_A_14 1.776 0.201 78.482 0.000 5.908 
GEAR_14 0.176 0.669 0.069 0.793 1.192 
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GEAR_S_14 -1.046 0.319 10.766 0.001 0.351 
N_CSH_14 -0.180 0.129 1.935 0.164 0.836 
S_CSH_14 -0.010 0.008 1.664 0.197 0.990 
CURRENT_14 -0.051 0.056 0.850 0.357 0.950 
EBIT_14 0.010 0.011 0.840 0.359 1.010 
INT_COV_14 -0.001 0.002 0.358 0.549 0.999 
TURNOVER_14 0.011 0.008 1.832 0.176 1.011 
Constant -26.738 3.015 78.651 0.000 0.000 
Table 14: Model 1: AUDIT_14 = LN_S_14 + GEAR_14 + GEAR_S_14 + N_CSH_14 + S_CSH_14 + 
CURRENT_14 + EBIT_14 + INT_CON_14 + TURNOVER_14 
Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
245.353 0.380 0.608    
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig.    
2.666 8 0.954    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(b) 
LN_S_14 2.758 0.310 79.086 0.000 15.776 
GEAR_14 -0.369 0.853 0.188 0.665 0.691 
GEAR_S_14 -0.160 0.314 0.257 0.612 0.853 
N_CSH_14 -0.049 0.150 0.106 0.745 0.952 
S_CSH_14 -0.011 0.009 1.553 0.213 0.989 
CURRENT_14 -0.015 0.062 0.059 0.809 0.985 
EBIT_14 -0.046 0.014 10.447 0.001 0.955 
INT_COV_14 0.002 0.002 0.694 0.405 1.002 
TURNOVER_14 -0.022 0.040 0.290 0.590 0.978 
Constant -41.149 4.619 79.365 0.000 0.000 
Table 15: Model 1: AUDIT_14 = LN_E_14 + GEAR_14 + GEAR_S_14 + N_CSH_14 + S_CSH_14 + 
CURRENT_14 + EBIT_14 + INT_CON_14 + TURNOVER_14 
Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
350.867 0.218 0.349    
Hosmer and Chi-square df Sig.    
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Lemeshow Test 4.383 8 0.821    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(b) 
LN_E_14 1.950 0.243 64.299 0.000 7.028 
GEAR_14 0.929 0.647 2.065 0.151 2.532 
GEAR_S_14 -0.519 0.254 4.193 0.041 0.595 
N_CSH_14 -0.028 0.124 0.050 0.823 0.973 
S_CSH_14 -0.003 0.007 0.215 0.643 0.997 
CURRENT_14 0.035 0.049 0.510 0.475 1.035 
EBIT_14 -0.002 0.012 0.026 0.872 0.998 
INT_COV_14 0.000 0.001 0.026 0.871 1.000 
TURNOVER_14 -0.011 0.020 0.285 0.593 0.989 
Constant -7.186 1.198 36.006 0.000 0.001 
 
First, all models reported above fit well the data according to Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test (chi-square sig. > 0.05). The percentage of variance explained varies from 21.8% to 
38% (according to Cox & Snell R Square) or from 34.9% to 60.8% (according to 
Nagelkerke R Square). It is reminded that these values should be interpreted with cau-
tion as they constitute approximations of linear regression's R Square. With respect to 
classification accuracy (results not reported on preceding tables), Models 1, 2, and 3 
correctly classify 84.6%, 90.2%, and 82.2% of firms, respectively. Given that the respec-
tive models without variants correctly classify 80.7%, 80.7%, and 80.8% of firms, it is 
noted that all models lead to improvement in classification accuracy. Among the three, 
Model 2 seems to do the best job (classification accuracy increases by about 10 per-
centage units). With respect to variables included in models, size enters all models, 
debt enters Models 1 and 3 while profitability enters only Model 2. Size variables have 
the highest Exp(B) value in all models, hence they can be consider the most important 
predictors of a firm's choice to be voluntarily audited. Their significance is also evident 
by the fact that estimating Models 1, 2, and 3 using the likelihood ratio forward step-
wise method, size variables continue to enter each model. Size is always positively re-
lated to the probability of being voluntarily audited given that its coefficient's sign is 
positive and Exp(B) > 1 in all models. This is sufficient evidence not to reject Hypothesis 
1: the larger the firm, the more probable it is to opt for audit. As far as the rest of sig-
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nificant variables are concerned, the ratio of non-current liabilities to current liabilities 
(Models 1 and 3) is negatively related to the probability of voluntary audit given both 
its coefficient's negative sign and that Exp(B) < 1. Consequently, an increase in this ra-
tio by 1 unit leads to a decrease of voluntary audit probability. Hence, we reject Hy-
pothesis 2 that predicts a positive relationship between voluntary audit and debt (at 
least with respect to debt structure). Instead, it seems that debt has but limited effect 
on voluntary audit. Profitability enters only Model 2 with an Exp(B) very close to 1 that 
implies a marginal effect of profitability on the choice of voluntary audit. Consequent-
ly, there is evidence to reject Hypothesis 4 that predicts a significant relationship be-
tween financial performance and audit. Finally, it must be noted that ownership varia-
bles enter no model leading us to fully reject Hypothesis 3.  
The following 3 tables report results for alternative models (Model 4, Model 5, and 
Model 6, respectively).  
Table 16: Model 4: AUDIT_14 = LN_A_13 + GEAR_13 + GEAR_S_13 + CURRENT_13 + EBIT_13 + 
INT_CON_13 + TURNOVER_13 
Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
1217.079 0.221 0.361    
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig.    
4.848 8 0.774    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
LN_A_13 1.692 0.104 267.115 0.000 5.432 
GEAR_13 -0.165 0.331 0.249 0.618 0.848 
GEAR_S_13 -0.354 0.107 10.946 0.001 0.702 
CURRENT_13 -0.022 0.030 0.529 0.467 0.979 
EBIT_13 0.013 0.005 6.621 0.010 1.013 
INT_COV_13 0.000 0.001 0.119 0.730 1.000 
TURNOVER_13 0.016 0.006 7.335 0.007 1.016 
Constant -26.765 1.570 290.700 0.000 0.000 
Table 17: Model 5:  AUDIT_14 = LN_S_13 + GEAR_13 + GEAR_S_13 + CURRENT_13 + EBIT_13 + 
INT_CON_13 + TURNOVER_13 
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Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
1023.045 0.303 0.495    
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig.    
21.824 8 0.005    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(b) 
LN_S_13 2.128 0.124 292.422 0.000 8.395 
GEAR_13 -0.394 0.376 1.099 0.295 0.675 
GEAR_S_13 0.030 0.064 0.220 0.639 1.030 
CURRENT_13 0.003 0.030 0.011 0.916 1.003 
EBIT_13 -0.022 0.007 9.581 0.002 0.978 
INT_COV_13 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.984 1.000 
TURNOVER_13 -0.011 0.008 2.016 0.156 0.989 
Constant -32.590 1.860 307.049 0.000 0.000 
Table 18: Model 6:  AUDIT_14 = LN_E_13 + GEAR_13 + GEAR_S_13 + CURRENT_13 + EBIT_13 + 
INT_CON_13 + TURNOVER_13 
Model 
Summary 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square    
1256.135 0.190 0.306    
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig.    
24.823 8.000 0.002    
Variables 
in the 
Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(b) 
LN_E_13 1.820 0.122 220.806 0.000 6.174 
GEAR_13 0.132 0.327 0.164 0.686 1.141 
GEAR_S_13 -0.134 0.091 2.189 0.139 0.875 
CURRENT_13 0.002 0.028 0.004 0.947 1.002 
EBIT_13 0.004 0.006 0.457 0.499 1.004 
INT_COV_13 0.001 0.001 1.867 0.172 1.001 
TURNOVER_13 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.956 1.000 
Constant -6.683 0.434 237.366 0.000 0.001 
 
From the 3 models presented above, only Model 4 fits the data according to Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test (chi-square sig < 0.05). This model correctly classifies 84.1% of 
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firms compared to 81.8% of correctly classified firms by the model without variables. 
Consequently, classification accuracy increases though not dramatically. Size, the ratio 
of non-current liabilities to current liabilities, profitability, and net assets turnover are 
the only variables having a significant coefficient (with Wald-sig < 0.05). Exp(B) is high-
er than 1 for size implying that larger firms have a higher probability of being voluntary 
auditing. This further supports Hypothesis 1. Exp(B) is less than 1 for profitability and 
net assets turnover implying a negative relationship between the respective variables 
and the probability of voluntary audit. This evidence partially supports Hypothesis 3. In 
this absence of significant coefficients for debt variables, Hypothesis 2 is rejected at 
least regarding the significance of debt variables. Instead, it could be stated that debt 
affects voluntary audit neither positively nor negatively. It must also be noted that Hy-
pothesis 4 cannot be tested by Models 4, 5, and 6 in the absence of ownership varia-
bles for 2013. 
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Conclusions 
This study investigated the choice of voluntary audit by firms in Greece. Audit has been 
present since ancient times and has then evolved to become one of the most im-
portant prerequisites of sound corporate financial decisions on behalf of not only in-
ternal but also external stakeholders. Financial report audits are not obligatory for eve-
ry company however. In Europe (in particular: EU), a number of criteria, mainly regard-
ing firm size (in terms of assets, sales and the number of employees), are used to pro-
vide exemptions from mandatory audit but the fact that some firms choose to have 
their financial reports voluntarily audited rises questions as to what factors could ex-
plain such decisions. A number of theories, most of them based on existing corporate 
finance theories, have been proposed to explain both the incentives and benefits of 
voluntary audit.  
Agency, signaling, and management factors are assumed to affect a firm's decision to 
have their financial reports voluntary audited. Agency theory supports the view that 
voluntary auditing may serve as a mechanism to deal with agency conflicts between 
ownership and management arising because corporate owners differ from managers 
in terms of incentives , each group pursuing the maximization of personal wealth. In 
the presence of audit, however, the ability of managers to exploit corporate wealth to 
their personal benefit is expected to significantly decrease. Agency conflicts arise also 
between management and other stakeholders as well. A particular case refers to the 
conflict between the company and its creditors where audit could serve as reassurance 
of sincere financial reporting and is often imposed to the company within the context 
of contractual agreements (e.g. loans). Signaling generally refers to a company's effort 
of sending messages (“signals”) regarding its positive future prospects. Voluntary audit 
can, in this case, be used as a proof that the company has no fear of having its financial 
reports audited despite the right not to do it. In other words, it is expected that audit-
ing provides a company's financial reports with increased quality, in terms of trustwor-
thiness, that could help companies in a variety of negotiating situations. Management 
factors that are used to explain the choice of voluntary audit are based on the assump-
tion that management could possibly lose or be afraid of losing internal control when a 
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company's size, in terms of administrative or operational levels, starts to highly in-
crease. In this case, voluntary audit is used as an internal control mechanism to elimi-
nate the probability of any internal “misconduct”. Based on these theories, as well as 
other less popular, a number of hypotheses have been developed and empirically test-
ed. However, agreement on the factors affecting the decision of voluntary audit has 
yet to be achieved. This calls for further research in order to assist the establishment 
of a stronger theoretical background for the topic under investigation.  
Despite the worth noticing attention given to the topic abroad, relevant research is 
almost entirely absent in the case of Greek firms. Consequently, empirical investigation 
of voluntary audit on behalf of Greek companies is necessary from both a theoretical 
and practical point of view. Simply put, providing relevant empirical findings could, on 
the one hand, assist the formulation of a more complete theoretical background for 
the topic and, also, offer a deeper know-how of relevant corporate practices in Greece.    
Empirical investigation was based on a sample of 2,306 unlisted firms located in 
Greece that satisfy the most recent official criteria of audit exemption. This sample in-
cludes 387 firms that decided to be voluntarily audited in 2014 and another 1,919 ones 
that preferred reserve their right to be exempted from auditing. The fact that most 
firms choose not be audited gives additional support for the need to explain Greek 
firms' attitude towards voluntary audit. In doing so, both univariate and multivariate 
statistical methods were applied to test whether voluntarily audit results from a num-
ber of factors such as the size of a company, its debt, ownership characteristics, and 
financial performance. 
In the first place, we found that most Greek SMEs choose not to be voluntarily audited 
and this is valid separately for retailers and manufacturers as well as for all firms alto-
gether. Our findings suggest, also, that the decision of voluntarily audit can only be 
partially explained, at least as far as the approach adopted here is concerned. To ex-
plain, conclusions change depending on the methodological approach adopted, i.e. 
univariate measures versus multivariate models.  
Corporate size significantly and positively affects the decision to be voluntarily audited 
and this is verified by both uni- and multivariate analysis. Findings based on univariate 
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analysis show that audited firms are significantly larger than unaudited ones both in 
the year of auditing and the preceding one. Additionally, size enters all logistic regres-
sion models and increases the probability of being voluntary audit in all cases even 
when it is lagged, i.e. when size of year “t” is used to predict voluntary audit in year 
“t+1”. Simply put, larger firms are more probable to “go for it” and this holds irrespec-
tive of methodology. This could have several explanations. First, larger companies may 
more easily deal with the costs of auditing since they are, normally, considered as be-
ing in a better position in terms of economic resources. Another possible explanation 
lies in the fact that larger companies are more probable to rise external finance, espe-
cially in the form of bank loans for several reason (e.g. higher value of collateral). This 
possibility is further enhanced by the fact that the debt ratio as well as the ratio of 
long- to short-term liabilities is higher for audited firms both in the year of audit and 
the preceding one. Therefore, voluntary audit of larger firms could be the result of 
contractual requirements (in our case bank loans). Third, the number of managerial 
and/ or operational layers is expected to be higher in larger firms and, consequently, 
the positive relation between size and voluntary audit could be attributed to manage-
ment's intention to preserve internal control. Another possible explanation of the posi-
tive relation between size and voluntary audit is provided by signaling theory. In par-
ticular, larger firms may choose to be voluntarily audited in order to enhance their 
“image” probably because their stakeholders would feel more “comfortable” to do 
business with a partner whose financial reports (and, in general, operations) are audit-
ed even when they could be exempted from this. It must be noted that conclusions 
regarding size and voluntary audit are in line with the greatest part of existing litera-
ture.  
Debt seems to significantly and positively affect the decision of voluntary audit but, in 
most cases, the underlying relationship is not significant. In particular, univariate anal-
ysis suggests that gearing is higher for voluntarily audited firms in the year preceding 
auditing but not in the year of audit. Additionally, audited firms rely more heavily in 
long-term liabilities but, once again, this is valid only for the year before the audit. Re-
gression analysis marginally supports any significant relationship between debt and 
voluntary auditing. Taken together, these conclusions oppose relevant evidence in ex-
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isting literature. A possible explanation could be centered around the role of size in 
explaining voluntary audit earlier reported. To explain, it is possible that the infor-
mation content of debt variables is dominated by that of size and, thus, debt fails to 
further explain the choice of voluntary audit. This could perhaps be the case especially 
if one accepts that size accounts, among others, for external financing (see relevant 
comments above). 
Interestingly, ownership variables seem to be totally unable to explain voluntary audit. 
In terms of univariate analysis, we found that both groups of firms are owned by 3 ma-
jor shareholders that, altogether, control approximately 80% of stocks. This is obvious-
ly the reason why these variables fail to enter any logistic regression model. To explain, 
ownership characteristics are usually considered as signs of potential agency conflicts. 
Therefore, if both audited firms and unaudited ones face the same agency conflicts it is 
natural that such conflicts cannot help discriminate between the two groups. Thus, 
contrary to a number of existing studies suggesting a strong relationship between 
ownership characteristics (particularly, family ownership) and voluntary audit, we find 
absolutely no evidence to support a similar conclusion. 
Conclusions about the relationship between financial performance and voluntary au-
diting are not totally clear. In particular, the two groups of firms do differ in terms of 
all respective measures one year before the audit according to univariate analysis. 
However, the cases of significant differences not only decrease in the year of audit but 
also change direction (one of them). From the four measures of financial performance 
considered, only profitability seems to be significantly related to the probability of vol-
untary auditing but, still, this does not alter aforementioned conclusions. Therefore, 
our conclusions are not in line with existing evidence suggesting that financial perfor-
mance, at least some of its aspects, significantly affects a firm's decision to be volun-
tarily audited. Given that different aspects of financial performance were examined, 
the only logical explanation that comes to mind about the weak role of financial per-
formance in voluntary auditing relates to variable definition (we will return to this 
point latter on).  
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Further evidence on audit choices reveals that neither “Big 4” auditors nor auditing 
companies are particularly “popular” in Greece. In fact, most audited firms choose to 
have their financial reports audited by auditors that do not belong to the “Big 4” group 
and their preference towards auditing companies is equally strong compared to that 
towards independent auditors.  The “rejection” of “Big 4” auditors could be attributed 
to cost issues: “Big 4” auditors are expected to be more costly and, thus, Greek com-
panies prefer other auditing companies. Additionally, it may be the case that Greek 
companies do not perceive “Big 4” auditors as superior auditors (to pay for) compared 
to the rest of auditing companies and/ or independent auditors. This possibility is fur-
ther enhanced by the fact that auditing companies (except for “Big 4”) and independ-
ent auditors are equally preferred by audited companies. Simply put, Greek firms that 
are voluntarily audited may think that what matters is the audit per se and not the au-
ditor. It must be noted, that mixed evidence on audit characteristics is not “news”. Part 
of existing literature also provides with inconclusive evidence.  
Before concluding, two major shortcomings of the present study should be mentioned. 
First, the sample used is rather limited from a time perspective as audit and ownership 
data were only available for 2014 (due the database used to collect them). This means 
that potentially valuable information has not been considered. For instance, it was im-
possible to investigate whether voluntary audit in a certain year is related to the volun-
tary audit of previous or next years, a relationship found to be significant in some re-
lated studies. Similarly, we were unable to examine possible effects of changes in 
ownership structure on voluntary audit. More importantly, the nature of major share-
holders was totally neglected due to lack of relevant data. However, it has been well 
documented that different shareholders have different incentives and, by extension, 
agency conflicts depend not only on quantitative but also qualitative features of own-
ership. Additionally, there was no way to investigate factors affecting a company's de-
cision to stop being voluntarily audited, i.e. why companies voluntarily audited in a 
specific year choose not to be audited in the following one. The second major disad-
vantage of this study is inherent in almost all studies that aim explaining corporate de-
cisions based on publicly available data and regards variable definition. For instance, 
debt was defined using two measures but it is obvious that numerous other could have 
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been considered. Similarly, profitability could be accounted for by at least thirty or so 
measures instead of using just one. However, as already stated, this is something any 
researcher must live with and there can be no a priori guarantee that some measures 
are superior than others, especially when the measures used in a particular study are 
identical or, at least similar, to those examined elsewhere in relevant literature. Fur-
thermore, it is worth mentioning that both the study's quantitative nature and the da-
tabase used excluded, by definition, the consideration of qualitative factors that have 
so far been proved useful in explaining voluntary audit.  
To sum up, preliminary evidence reported here could be further supplemented with 
relevant methodological, as well as other, improvements in order to more fully investi-
gate the underlying topic. It is reminded that, to the author's knowledge, this is the 
first effort to explain why some companies in Greece choose not to be exempted from 
financial report auditing. Although some very basic questions have been answered, the 
major part of relevant research in Greece is yet to be done.  
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